The Costs of Risk: Examining the Missing Link between Globalization and Social Spending by Stephanie J. Rickard
Institute for International Integration Studies  
IIIS Discussion Paper  
No.185 / November 2006
The Costs of Risk: Examining the Missing Link between
Globalization and Social Spending 
Stephanie J. Rickard
Penn State University 
 
IIIS Discussion Paper No. 185 
 
 
The Costs of Risk: Examining the Missing Link between Globalization 
and Social Spending  
 
 
Stephanie J. Rickard 


















    Disclaimer 
   Any opinions expressed here are those of the author(s) and not those of the IIIS. 
   All works posted here are owned and copyrighted by the author(s).   
   Papers may only be downloaded for personal use only. 
 The Costs of Risk: 
Examining the Missing Link between Globalization and Social Spending 
 
 
Stephanie J. Rickard 







Globalization is often credited with the expansion of the welfare state and increased spending on 
social insurance programs. However, empirical evidence on the relationship between 
globalization and social welfare spending is mixed. One possible explanation for these mixed 
results might be country-specific factors that mediate the effect of globalization on social 
spending, such as key characteristics of a country’s labor market. Countries with fluid, flexible 
labor markets likely respond to globalization differently than countries with rigid, inflexible 
markets. At the micro level, workers who find it costly to adjust to market volatility will likely 
demand compensatory and insurance programs to offset the high costs of adjustment. Given this, 
the relationship between globalization and social insurance is likely to be more sharply positive 
among countries with relatively immobile labor. I test this argument using data on social 
expenditures in both developed and developing countries. The findings indicate that trade 
exposure increases social spending in countries where workers face high adjustment costs. When 
workers face low adjustment costs, trade exposure has a strong reductive effect on social 
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Introduction 
Globalization is often credited with the expansion of the welfare state and greater 
government spending on social insurance programs (Cameron 1978, Katzenstein 1985, Rodrik 
1998, Garrett 1998). However, empirical evidence of the relationship between globalization and 
social welfare spending is mixed. Although prominent studies like those by Cameron (1978), 
Hicks and Swank (1992), and Huber et al. (1993) find a positive relationship between trade 
exposure and government spending, other studies by Garrett and Mitchell (2001), Burgoon 
(2003), and Kaufman and Segura-Ubiergo (2001) find that trade openness has a negative and 
significant effect on welfare spending. In response to this mixed evidence, scholars have begun 
to investigate the empirical validity of the assumptions underlying the expected positive 
relationship between globalization and social spending, namely that: (1) globalization will lead 
to greater labor market volatility and higher risk of unemployment; (2) workers facing greater 
labor market volatility will demand greater social spending; and (3) governments respond to 
demands for greater social spending.  
Several prominent studies have examined the conditions under which the first and third 
assumptions are likely to hold. For example, Iversen and Cusack (2001) investigate whether 
globalization actually generates enough market volatility to spur workers to demand greater 
social spending. Adsera and Boix (2002), like Rudra and Haggard (2005), examine when and 
under what conditions government respond to demands for increased social spending generated 
by globalization. However, much less attention has been paid to the second critical assumption 
underlying the ‘compensation hypothesis’: that workers facing greater labor market volatility 
demand greater social spending. Most studies implicitly or, in the case of Rudra (2003), 
explicitly assume that all workers facing increased market volatility demand higher levels of   2
social spending. However, market volatility is not equally costly (or worrisome) for all workers. 
Some workers are able to respond to market volatility with relative ease and few costs. For 
example, workers with general skills that are valued by many employers across a wide range of 
industries find it relatively easier (i.e. cheaper) to adjust to increased labor market volatility than 
workers with skills that are valuable to only a single employer.  
At the micro-level, workers with non-general skills face relatively higher adjustment 
costs. Adjustment costs include the search costs involved in finding a new job, the costs of re-
training, foregone earnings, lower wages, and the potential obsolescence of skills (Fernandez de 
Cordoba, Laird and Serena 2004). These costs are determined, in part, by individuals’ 
characteristics, such as age, level of education, and skill sets. Workers’ skills may be either 
general or specific in nature. General skills are valued by many employers across a wide range of 
industries. In contrast, specific skills are valuable to only a select set of employers often 
concentrated in a single industry or sector. Workers with specific skills face relatively higher 
adjustment costs, as they often face longer unemployment spells and the near certainty of lower 
wages upon reemployment. As a consequence, specific-skill workers are relatively more 
vulnerable to market volatility and consequently prefer higher levels of spending on income 
insurance and social welfare programs, as convincingly demonstrated by Iversen and Soskice 
(2001).
1  
It seems straight forward to suggest that this micro-level argument has important macro-
level implications, especially given that workers’ skill sets vary systematically across countries. 
Cross-national variance in the adjustment costs facing workers is due, in part, to differences in 
                                                 
1 It is important to note that volatility resulting from increased exposure to foreign trade is itself exogenous to the 
skill sets of a country’s labor force. Iversen and Soskice (2001) assume, however, that risk is endogenous to skill 
specificity (875).  
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countries’ education systems (Iversen and Soskice 2001), market structures (Hall and Soskice 
2001), and economic development (Hiscox 2002). At the macro level, government expenditures 
on social insurance programs should be related to the market volatility and adjustment costs 
facing the median voter. The relationship between globalization and social insurance should be 
more sharply positive in countries where the median voter faces relatively high adjustment costs. 
This argument suggests a possible explanation for the mixed empirical evidence found to 
date regarding the effect of globalization on social spending. The ability of workers to adjust to 
market volatility mediates the effect of globalization on social spending. Countries in which 
workers can adjust to market volatility with relative ease likely exhibit different policy responses 
to globalization than countries with specific-skill labor. Failure to account for cross-national 
variance in costs of adjustment may explain, in part, the mixed empirical evidence found to date 
regarding the effect of globalization on social spending.  
In the following section, I review briefly related arguments and existing studies of the 
globalization-welfare nexus. The argument relating labor mobility, globalization, and social 
spending is then developed formally. Finally, this argument is tested using macro-level spending 
data for both developing and developed countries.  
 
Literature Review 
Two competing arguments exist regarding the relationship between globalization and 
social insurance. The first, termed the efficiency perspective, argues that increased international 
competition generates pressures for a reduction in government spending on social insurance. 
Social spending is assumed to reduce the international competitiveness of a country’s products. 
Higher levels of social spending may, for example, engender higher payroll taxes, which increase   4
the costs of labor and reduce the competitiveness of a country’s products. Additionally, footloose 
capital can avoid paying higher taxes imposed to fund more generous social programs by moving 
to a different country. Taken together, this implies that globalization will result in lower levels of 
social spending, all else constant. In contrast, the compensation hypothesis (or embedded 
liberalism thesis) argues that globalization generates incentives for greater social spending. This 
is because increased exposure to international trade generates short-term adjustment costs, 
dislocations, economic insecurity, and unequal distributive effects. This is true regardless of 
countries’ factor endowments, comparative advantages or the long-term net economic gains 
brought by trade liberalization.
2 In response to increased market volatility, domestic actors 
demand greater social spending to offset the costs of increased trade exposure.  
The compensation hypothesis is based on three critical assumptions. First, globalization 
is assumed to lead to greater labor market volatility and higher risk of unemployment. Second, it 
is assumed that workers facing greater labor market volatility will demand greater social 
spending. Third, governments facing workers’ demand for greater social spending are assumed 
to respond by increasing the level of expenditures. In part in response to the mixed empirical 
results found regarding the effect of globalization on social spending, researchers have begun to 
investigate the conditions under which these assumptions are likely to hold. To date the vast 
majority of such research has focused primarily on the first and third assumptions. For example, 
a rigorous debate surrounds the assumption that globalization leads to increased market volatility 
(e.g. Wacziarg and Wallack 2004). For example, Iversen and Cusack (2001) call into question 
whether globalization generates enough market volatility to spur workers to demand greater 
social spending.
3 If trade does not increase job security, the compensation hypothesis by 
                                                 
2 Leamer 1997; Rodrik 1997. 
3 They argue that deindustrialization causes considerably larger labor market dislocations.   5
definition cannot be true. There are, however, several reasons why greater trade openness is 
expected to lead to greater economic insecurity. First, openness will tend to increase the 
elasticity of labor demand for all workers (Rodrik 1997, 1998; Scheve and Slaughter 2004). 
Second, trade exposure may signal more general exposure to risk of market dislocation that fuel 
subjective insecurity (Burgoon 2003). Importantly, even a small amount of market volatility may 
impose significant costs for some workers.  
An equally important debate sounds the assumption that workers demands translate into 
policy outcomes. Research on this assumption generally focuses on those political institutions 
that are likely to mitigate the effect of increased demand for compensation on actual policy 
outcomes (e.g. Swank 1998). Adsera and Boix (2002), for example, examine the importance of 
regime type. They find that democratically elected governments are relatively more responsive to 
demands for increased social spending resulting from trade openness than non-democratically 
elected regimes. Garrett (1998) argues that globalization will result in greater social insurance 
only when Left-Labor power and/or corporatism are in place.
4 Iversen and Cusack (2001) argue 
that governments elected via proportional electoral rules will be relatively more responsive to 
demands for increased social spending. Taken together, these studies suggest that political 
institutions mediate the effect of globalization on observed levels of social spending via the 
supply side of the policy making process.  
Given the relatively large bodies of scholarship that examine two of the three critical 
assumptions underlying the compensation hypothesis, the lack of attention given the assumption 
that workers facing greater labor market volatility demand greater social spending is somewhat 
puzzling. I address this gap in the literature by examining when and under what circumstances 
                                                 
4 Interestingly, a strong Left party aligned with labor’s interests is possible only when workers are relatively mobile 
between uses in the domestic economic, as demonstrated by Hiscox (2002).   6
workers respond to increased trade exposure be demanding greater spending on social insurance 
programs. I argue that not all workers response to increased trade exposure by demanding greater 
social spending. Instead, workers’ response to increased market volatility is conditional on the 
costs of adjustment they face. Workers with specific skills face higher adjustment costs than 
workers with more general skills, all else equal. As a consequence, workers with specific skills 
are more likely to respond to globalization with demands for greater social spending.
5 In short, I 
argue that the adjustment costs facing the median voter in a given economy condition the effect 
of globalization on social spending.  
Several other mediating variables have recently been suggested by scholars of the 
globalization-welfare nexus. One such set of mediating variables focuses exclusively on the 
supply side of the story, namely domestic political institutions. These arguments typically 
suggest that a positive relationship between globalization and social spending will exist only 
when certain political institutions are in place (e.g. Adsera and Boix 2002; Garrett 1998). 
Another possible mediating variable recently suggested is economic development. Preliminary 
evidence suggests that the direction of the effect of globalization varies across developed and 
developing countries. Rudra (2003) argues that globalization has a positive effect on social 
spending in developed countries but negative effect in developing countries.
6  I argue here that 
the distinction between developed and developing countries is perhaps less critical than the 
distinction between specific-labor and mobile-labor countries. Skill specificity often correlates 
with economic development; more developed countries tend to display lower average levels of 
                                                 
5 Iversen and Cusack (2001) make a similar argument with respect to deindustrialization. They argue that the effect 
of deindustrialization on welfare spending is conditional on the skill system and on the electoral system. Iversen 
(2005) concedes that this logic has never been directly linked to globalization (183).  
6 She argues that this is because countries with relatively more skilled workers will exhibit larger increases in 
welfare spending as a result of globalization. This prediction is strikingly similar to my own. However, we arrive at 
this prediction quite differently. Rudra argues that skilled labor is better able to organize because of lower collective 
action costs. In contrast, I argue that skilled labor has larger incentives to overcome the challenges of collective 
action because they face relatively high adjustment costs.    7
labor mobility (Hiscox 2002). However, this is not always the case and significant variation in 
workers’ skill characteristics exist among both developed and developing countries, as 
demonstrated by the VOC literature (e.g. Hall and Soskice 2001; Iversen and Soskice 2001). The 
distinction between mobile-labor countries and specific-labor countries provides a novel micro-
level explanation for why some countries exhibit a positive relationship between globalization 
and welfare spending while others exhibit a negative relationship. 
As argued here, the positive relationship between globalization and social spending 
posited by the compensation perspective is most likely to hold amongst countries with specific 
labor and high adjustment costs. In contrast, the relationship between globalization and social 
insurance in countries with general-skill workers is likely to be less strongly positive. Indeed, it 
may be the case that the negative relationship posited by the efficiency perspective is more likely 
to hold amongst general-skill countries. Failure to account for the key characteristics of countries 
labor forces, namely the costs of adjustment, may explain, in part, the mixed empirical results 
surrounding the globalization-welfare nexus. In the next section, I present a fuller explanation for 
why this may be the case.  
 
Argument 
The adjustment costs facing the median voter in a given country condition the effect of 
globalization on social spending. Where the costs of adjustment are relatively high, the effect of 
globalization on social spending is more likely to be positive. The costs of adjustment are 
exogenous to market volatility and include the search costs involved in finding a new job, the 
costs of re-training, foregone earnings, lower wages, and the potential obsolescence of skills 
(Fernandez de Cordoba, Laird and Serena 2005). These costs are determined by individuals’   8
characteristics, such as age, level of education, and skill sets. Workers’ skills may be either 
general or specific in nature. General skills are valued by many employers across a wide range of 
industries. In contrast, specific skills are valuable to only a select set of employers often 
concentrated in a single industry or sector. Workers with specific skills face relatively higher 
adjustment costs, as they often face longer unemployment spells and the near certainty of lower 
wages if reemployed. As a consequence, specific-skill workers are relatively more vulnerable to 
market volatility. When there is little market volatility and a low risk of involuntary separation 
like, for example, in a closed economy with firing restrictions, both mobile and immobile 
workers have little incentive to lobby for social spending. However, as market volatility 
increases the preferences of specific and mobile labor begin to diverge. Specific labor facing 
relatively higher adjustment costs will begin lobbying for insurance transfers before mobile 
labor. Specific-skill workers prefer higher levels of spending on social insurance programs than 
general-skill workers when facing increased market volatility. This is because workers with 
specific skills have more to loose from unemployment than general-skill workers as workers 
with general skills can move between jobs with relative few costs, either in terms of income loss 
or time unemployed 
To demonstrate this formally, I build on a model developed by Iversen and Soskice 
(2001). They demonstrate convincingly that specific-skill workers prefer greater social insurance 
than general-skill workers, holding all else constant. Insights from this micro-level argument 
have interesting, yet previously unobserved, macro-level implications for the relationship 
between globalization and spending on social insurance programs. Prior to liberalization, 
countries in which the median voter is a specific-skilled worker should tend to spend relatively 
more on social insurance programs than countries characterized by general-skill workers.   9
Following liberalization, increases in social spending are most likely among specific-skill 
countries. Increases in social spending are likely to be relatively larger in specific-skill countries.  
 
Model 
Like Iversen and Soskice (2001), I assume that workers derive their income from their 
skill sets. Workers are paid sg, the value of her combined specific and general skills. The market 
value of a worker’s general skills is defined as g. All workers have general skills. If a worker has 
no specific skills, then s = 1 and she is always employed at the market value of her general skills. 
If a worker has specific skills, then s is greater than 1.  
In addition to the income earned from their skills, workers receive transfers from the 
government. Such transfers may include unemployment benefits, health care benefits, pensions 
and other forms of non-wage compensation. Like Iversen and Soskice, I assume that transfers 
come in the form of a flat-rate payment R. All workers receive that same flat-rate subsidy.  
Transfers are paid out of a flat-rate tax (t) on all wages. Total per-capital receipts are T 
and all receipts are spent on transfers. As in the Meltzer-Richard model, taxation is assumed to 




1t +  
Where l(t) is the number of hours worked or the intensity of effort. Tax income per capita is 
defined as  
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where w is defined as the average hourly pretax earnings. Given this, the disposable income for 
specific-skill workers is equal to: 


















Following liberalization, workers may experience either: 1) continued employment in the same 
job or 2) unemployment. Given this, workers’ expected utility is equal to: 
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where p is the probability of being unemployed. To determine the effect of increased market 
volatility, I take the derivative of workers expected utility with respect to p. The derivative with 
respect to p is equal to: 
∂/∂p= 
s − () g





If no transfers are provided by the government, any increase in the risk of unemployment lowers 
workers’ expected utility. This is because ∂/∂p < 0 for both specific-skill and general-skill 
workers when R is equal to 0.  
∂/∂p= (-s)g 
 
When no transfers are provided by the government, all workers lose from increased risk of 
unemployment. However, specific skill workers lose relatively more than general skill workers,   11
as illustrated in Figure 1. Does the same hold when generous transfers are provided by the 
government? To address this question, I substitute R equal to (w/2). This is the maximum 
possible value of R where the tax rate (t) is equal to 1.  
Following this substitution, the derivative of workers expected utility with respect to p is 
equal to zero. Workers facing an increased risk of unemployment when transfers are equal to 
their maximum possible level (R = w/2), do not expect either an increase or decrease in their 
expect utility. Indeed when transfers are provided at the maximum possible level, workers 
neither gain nor lose from increased unemployment risk. An interesting implication of this result 
is that it is likely to be prohibitively expensive for governments to buy off opposition to 
globalization using social spending. It would, in theory, require a tax rate approaching 100%. It 
is only at the maximum level of R, that workers are indifferent about their exposure to 
unemployment risk.  
As transfers become more generous (i.e. as R increases from 0 to w/2), the rate at which 
workers expected utility declines as a result of increased unemployment risk decreases. Across 
all values of R less than w/2, however, specific-skill workers lose relatively more than general-
skill workers from increased risk of unemployment. Specific-skill workers always prefer higher 
levels of transfers than general-skill workers because any given increase in p results in a 
relatively greater loss for specific-skill workers. This result is similar to that found by Iversen 
and Soskice (2001). They, however, hold the level of risk (p) constant and take the derivative of 
R with respect to g. In contrast, I take the derivative of p in order to identify how workers’ utility 
changes in response to change in market volatility and unemployment risk. While Iversen and 
Soskice (2001) argue that exposure to risk is inversely related to the portability of workers skills 
(875), I argue that risk exposure is exogenous to workers’ skill sets. Workers’ exposure to risk is   12
determined here by their country’s exposure to international trade.
7 The costs of risk are 
inversely related to the portability of workers’ skills. For workers with highly portable skills (i.e. 
general skills), the cost of unemployment risk or market volatility is relatively low. In contrast, 
market volatility and unemployment risk entail significant costs for specific-skill workers and as 
a result, these workers demand relatively greater spending on social insurance programs. 
 
Empirical evidence 
The prediction derived from the simple formal model developed above is that the 
relationship between globalization and income insurance should be more sharply positive in 
countries where the median voter faces relatively high adjustment costs, all else equal. A 
convincing test of this argument would compare two countries with the same level of exposure to 
the international market where one of the countries has relatively mobile labor and the other has 
specific labor. The expectation is that larger increases in social spending following trade 
liberalization will be observed in the country with specific-skill workers.  
As a first cut, I examine a sample of 31 countries that liberalized their trade policies after 
1975 but prior to 1994.
8 I divide these countries into two groups based of the observed level of 
labor mobility in each.
9 I then examine the year-to-year differences in spending on social 
security and welfare as a percentage of total government expenditures three years prior to and 
                                                 
7 This is a slight oversimplification as workers employed in the production of the good in which the country has a 
comparative advantage face little risk of involuntary separation as a result of increased trade exposure. 
8 Liberalization dates come from Wacziarg and Wallack (2004). I use their de facto liberalization years which are 
the years in which there is a year-to-year increase of 5% or more in the ratio of exports plus imports to GDP 
following Sachs and Warner’s (1995) de jure liberalization date.  
9 Labor mobility is measured using UNIDO employment data. For complete details, see the data and measurement 
section of this paper. Countries above the sample median are coded as specific-labor countries. Specific-labor 
countries include: AGR, COL, ECU, ESP, GTM, IND, IRN, KEN, MEX, NZL, PHL, PRY, URY, ZMB and ZWE. 
Mobile labor countries are those that fall below the sample median and include: BOL, BRA, CHL CHN, CMR, CRI, 
GHA, ISR, LKA, NIC, SLV, SYR, TTO, TUN, and TUR. Note that this sample of countries differs from the sample 
used to estimate the error correction models and OLS models presented later in the paper.    13
three years following trade liberalization.
10 The results are displayed in Figure 2. Data for mobile 
labor countries are presented on the left side; specific labor countries are on the right. Prior to 
trade liberalization, there are virtually no year-to-year changes in social spending in either the 
mobile labor or specific labor countries. In fact, the average yearly changes in social spending 
are virtually zero for each of the three years prior to liberalization. This is consistent with 
previous studies that suggest that spending on social programs changes only very slowly over 
time. We do, however, observe yearly increases in social spending following liberalization in 
specific-labor countries. Among specific-labor countries, average social spending levels increase 
during each of the three years following liberalization. The difference between yearly changes 
prior to and following liberalization is statistically significant among specific-labor countries, as 
determined by t-tests. This provides preliminary support for the argument advanced here. In the 
following section, I conduct more sophisticated empirical tests of this argument, controlling for 
important variables including economic development and growth. Before moving to these tests, I 
first describe in detail the measures of the key concepts.  
 
Data and Measurement 
Globalization 
In this paper, I focus exclusively on the effect of trade openness on social spending.
11 
Although globalization often refers to increased flows of goods, capital, and people across 
                                                 
10 Spending data come from the IMF Government Finance Statistics. Additional details about these data are 
provided in following sections.  
11 Some may object that trade openness is endogenous. However, at least some part of increased exposure to 
international trade can be considered exogenous. Trade flows have increased over the past decades in part because 
of innovations in transport and telecommunication (Garrett and Mitchell 2001, 150). This part of increased trade is 
exogenous to politics. Furthermore, developing countries have often been the recipients of loans and other aid 
packages that require a reduction in the country’s trade barriers. Although the decision to accept these packages is 
endogenous, the economic necessity of these packages may make it such that trade barrier reductions are effectively 
exogenous.   14
national boarders, here I examine only the effect of increased commodity trade for several 
reasons. First, theoretical models of international trade make precise predictions about the effect 
of increased trade on the fortunes of both mobile labor (Stolper and Samuelson 1941) and 
immobile labor (Jones 1971, Mussa 1974).
12 Second, developing countries are relatively more 
exposed to foreign goods than foreign capital. In the sample of 31 developing countries 
examined here, FDI inflows account for only 1.5 percent of GDP, on average, while foreign 
imports account for nearly 40 percent of GDP. Trade flows appear to be more relevant for 
developing countries than capital flows. For this reason, previous studies of the globalization-
welfare nexus have focused primarily on trade exposure rather than capital exposure (e.g. Rodrik 
1998). Recent studies that have examined the effects of both trade and capital openness on 
government spending generally find that trade exposure has a larger effect on spending than 
exposure to foreign capital inflows (Rudra and Haggard 2005; Avelino, Brown, Hunter 2005). 
For these reasons, I focus here on the effects of trade exposure on social spending. I leave the 
effects of FDI and capital inflows for future research. 
I use two different measures to estimate countries’ exposure to foreign trade. The first, a 
conventional measure of trade openness, is the sum of imports and exports divided by GDP.
 13 
These data are taken from the World Development Indicators. I also employ a second measure of 
trade exposure, namely the ratio of imports to GDP. I do so because I suspect that imports may 
have a substantively different effect on domestic demands for social spending. For example, 
exporters may prefer lower levels of social spending in order to increase the competitiveness of 
                                                 
12 Although Mundell (1957) demonstrates that factor flows can be a perfect substitute for trade in commodities in 
the standard Heckscher-Ohlin model with constant returns to scale. In theory then, capital inflows and imports may 
have similar effects on domestic labor.  
13 Although Avelino, Brown, and Hunter (2005) make a persuasive argument about the use of trade measured as a 
percentage of GDP based on purchasing power parity, I do not use this measure here because PPP conversions are 
not available for my dependent variable. To maintain consistency in measurement, I use the conventional measure of 
trade openness, namely the sum of imports and exports as a percentage of GDP.    15
their products on the international market. As such, an increase in a country’s level of exports 
may increase the political clout of exporters (Rogowski 1989) who in turn demand lower levels 
of social spending. In short, one might expect a negative relationship between exports and social 
spending. In contrast, import-competiting producers, particularly those facing high adjustment 
costs, likely demand greater social spending, as argued above. Given this, it seems possible that 
the two components of conventional measures of trade openness (i.e. imports and exports) have 
opposite effects on social spending. Perhaps this might account for some part of the mixed 
empirical findings on the effect of trade openness on social spending. Given this possibility, I use 
imports as a percentage of GDP as an alternative measure of trade exposure. I expect that 
imports are more likely to exhibit the predicted effects on social spending than total trade, for the 
reasons outlined above.  
 
Social insurance  
To measure social spending, I use data on consolidated central government spending on 
social security and welfare programs as a percentage of total government expenditures.
14 Social 
security and welfare spending captures governments’ provision of certain types of social 
insurance programs, including disability, severance payments and unemployment benefits. These 
data come from the IMF Government Finance Statistics. This measure of social insurance 
spending is almost certainly an improvement over more aggregate measures of total government 
expenditures, current receipts, or government consumption used in previous studies of the 
globalization-welfare nexus (e.g. Adsera and Boix 2002, Rodrik 1998).
15 These aggregate 
                                                 
14 Following Rudra and Haggard (2005), I use government expenditures as the denominator in the dependent 
variable ratio rather than GDP. Ratios using GDP are strongly affected by the size of government. Also, GDP ratios 
arguably do not capture how governments allocate the resources directly under their control.  
15 Of course data on social spending in the developing world likely vary in quality.    16
measures of total government spending include many types of spending programs that likely 
respond to different economic and political stimuli than those suggested here. Social security and 
welfare programs are likely to be the most pertinent to the globalization-welfare nexus because 
they provide relatively direct insulation from market forces, as compared to education or health 
expenditures (or other types of expenditures, such as military expenditures, included in more 
aggregate measures of government spending). However, spending on social security and welfare 
programs also include pensions which are almost certainly more responsive to voters outside of 
the labor market.
16 Ideally, we would want to subtract pensions from this measure of social 
insurance however the lack of disaggregate data for non-OECD countries makes this impossible. 
Throughout the analysis, it is vital to keep in mind the importance of demographics for this 
spending variable. For this reason, all estimated models include a control variable for the relative 
size of a country’s aged population. It is also prudent to remember that the estimated effects of 




To estimate workers ability to adjust to market volatility, I calculate inter-industry wage 
differentials between low-skill manufacturing industries. This is one of the most direct measures 
of inter-industry labor mobility and has been used previously in numerous studies of labor 
mobility (e.g. Krueger and Summers 1998, Hiscox 2002). Here, I calculate the coefficient of 
variation for wage rates across manufacturing industries that are characterized by Wood and 
Mayer (1998) as employing primarily low-skill labor. Data are from UNIDO’s Industrial 
                                                 
16 Although Iversen (2005) argues that old-age insurance is a form of insurance against labor market volatility.    17
Statistical Database 3-digit level of ISIC Code Revision 2 (2005).
17 Higher values are taken as 
indicators of less mobile labor. When labor is highly mobile, movement between industries (or 
even just the potential for it) should equalize returns to similar types of workers across industries. 
Given this, high inter-industry wage differentials suggest the existence of high adjustment costs 
that prevent labor from moving from low-wage industries into high-wage industries. Smaller 
differentials are indicators of higher level of mobility.  
Although this measure has been widely used to estimate levels of labor mobility, there 
are some reasons to exercise caution when using this measure.
18 For example, wage differentials 
may exist due to differences in the skill levels of workers whose wages are compared. In an 
attempt to address this concern, I calculate wage differentials between those industries 
characterized as employing workers with similar skill levels. More precisely, I calculate the 
coefficient of variation for wage rates across the 15 manufacturing industries characterized by 
Wood and Mayer (1998) as being ‘low-skill’ industries. See Appendix A for more details on 
their industry characterizations.  
It is important to note that I focus here only on the effects of labor mobility and the costs 
of adjustment facing labor. It is possible that the same political logic applies to capital owners. 
That is, capital owners facing high adjustment costs are more likely to demand compensatory 
and/or income insurance programs than capital owners facing low adjustment costs. However, 
specific capital owners facing increased trade exposure (or capital inflows) likely demand 
different types of compensation than specific workers. While specific workers demand social 
                                                 
17 This series reports the number of people employed in each industry and the total amount of wages paid in the 
industry. The wage values are originally given in national currency values at current prices. These values are 
converted into current U.S. dollars using the average period exchange rates as given in the IMF International 
Financial Statistics (IFS). To calculate the average industry wage, I simply divide the industry’s total wage bill by 
the number of people employed in the industry.   
18 See Hiscox (2002) for a complete discussion of the potential weaknesses of this variable.    18
spending programs such as unemployment benefits, specific capital owners likely demand other 
types of programs, including subsidies and/or capital controls. Because I am primarily interested 
in social insurance programs, I focus here on the costs of adjustment facing labor. I estimate 
these costs using inter-industry wage differentials, as discussed above. 
 
Empirical models  
I am primarily interested in changes in social spending as a result of globalization. Given 
this, I use an error-correction model with panel corrected standard errors to estimate the effect of 
trade exposure (Beck and Katz 1995). This model allows for direct predictions about how 
changes in trade openness and labor mobility lead to changes in social spending. The estimated 
error correction model has the following form: 
 







i,t + εi,t 
 
where Yi,t is social expenditures in country i during year t and X is an independent variable. The 
superscript j indexes a particular independent variable. ∆ is the first difference operator. The 
model also includes country-specific intercepts αi.  
All models are run with a full set of country-specific intercepts to control for nationally-
specific effects. Because the models include a full set of country dummies, the variance to be 
explained is entirely intertemporal. The question then arises, does wage variance exhibit 
meaningful variance across time. If not, wage variance will be perfectly (or nearly perfectly) 
collinear with the countries dummies. Wage variance does, in fact, change over time, as 
demonstrated by Hiscox (2002). However, these changes occur slowly. The average year-to-year   19
change in wage differentials is only 0.2 for the sample of countries used here. To demonstrate the 
intertemporal variance in labor mobility, the wage differentials for four countries are plotted in 
Figure 1. The least amount of variance is observed in the United States during the period from 
1985 to 1995. Over this ten year period, the maximum value of wage variance was 26.5 and the 
minimum was 24.7. Although we do observe slight year-to-year changes during this period, the 
changes are relatively small suggesting that the wage differentials (and ultimately labor mobility) 
is relatively constant in the United States during this period. Given that labor mobility changes 
only slowly over time, the inclusion of country dummies absorbs some, but not all, of the 
explanatory power of wage variance. The estimated effects of wage variance on social spending 
would likely be far larger if country dummies were not included in the model.  
The error correction model has several advantages. First, it allows for differentiation 
between short-term and long-term effects. Coefficients for the change variables measure the 
short term effects of a one-off change in that variable (Iversen 2005). In contrast, the estimated 
coefficients for the level variables (i.e. lagged variables) capture the permanent (or lasting) effect 
of a one-off change in the variable. Statistically significant coefficients on a level variable 
indicate that there is a long-term causal relationship between trends in the independent variable 
and trends in the dependent variable (Kaufman and Segura-Ubiergo 2001, 567). The implication 
then is that the change measure of wage variance (∆Wage Variance) will likely have a smaller 
estimated effect on social spending than the level measure (L.Wage Variance).  
The error correction model has several other advantages. By differencing the series, the 
error correction model minimizes the potential for spurious correlation between two series 
exhibiting a time trend. The error correction model in combination with panel-corrected standard 
errors, country-specific intercepts, and a lagged dependent variable produces quite conservative   20
results. While this carries some risk that causal hypotheses will be rejected prematurely (i.e. a 
Type I error), it increases our confidence in the results that do emerge as significant.   
Although the error correction model has many benefits, several prominent studies of the 
globalization welfare nexus use pooled cross-section, time-series data in simple partial-
adjustment OLS models (e.g. Rodrik 1998, Garrett 1998, Rudra 2003; Avelino, Brown, and 
Hunter 2005). To allow for direct comparisons with previous studies, I estimate partial-
adjustment OLS models in addition to the error correction model. The partial-adjustment OLS 
model estimates long-term trends (Huber and Stephens 2001, 57) and equilibria values (Adsera 
and Boix 2002, 241). The partial-adjustment OLS model has the following form: 
 
Yi,t = αi + β1 · Yi,t-1 + β2 · Openness i,t-1  + β3 · Labor mobility i,t-1  +  
β4 · Openness i,t-1 · Labor mobility i,t-1  β
j · X
j
i,t-1 + εi,t 
 
where Yi,t is social expenditures in country i during year t and X is an independent variable 
where the superscript j  indexes a particular independent variable. The model also includes 
country-specific intercepts αi. β1 is the coefficient of lagged welfare spending, incorporated to 
alleviate problems of serial correlations across error terms.  
As in the error-correction model, economic development (GDP per capita), and 
economic growth are included as control variables. In the OLS models, I follow Huber and 
Stephens (2001) and include as a control variable the cumulative average of the aged population 
(i.e. percentage of total population over 65) since 1970. In the error correction model, I include 
the year-to-year change in the percent of the population over 65 and the lagged value of the 
percent of the population over 65.    21
 
Results  
The results of both the error correction model and the partial-adjustment OLS model are 
reported in Table 1. All models reported in Table 1 were estimated using a sample of 31 
developing, non-autocratic countries.
19 Data cover the period from 1976 to 1997 however; data 
are not available for all years for all countries. The countries and years during which they are 
included in the sample are listed in Appendix B. For all models reported in Table 1, trade 
exposure is estimated using imports as a percentage of GDP. Model 1 is an error correction 
model which includes a lagged dependent variable. Model 2 is an error correction model 
estimated without a lagged dependent variable. Achen (2000) demonstrates that the inclusion of 
a lagged dependent variable can underestimate the importance of other included variables, 
particularly is they do not vary dramatically over time. To address autocorrelation while 
simultaneously avoiding the problems of using a lagged dependent variable, I use the Prais-
Winsten estimation technique for Models 2 (and 4).  
In Models 1 and 2, the key interaction term is the product of the year-to-year changes in 
imports and the lagged level of wage variance.
20 I expect the coefficient for this interaction term 
to be positive and significant. Increased imports are expected to increase social spending when 
workers are relatively immobile between uses in the domestic economy. Recall that higher 
values of wage variance indicate lower levels of labor mobility. As expected, the interaction term 
is positive and significant in both models. The interaction term is also positive and significant in 
                                                 
19 Some readers may object that low skill labor in developing countries stands to gain from international trade. In 
developing countries, low-skill labor is often the more abundant factor. As demonstrated by the Stolper-Samuelson 
theorem, abundant factors gain from increased trade, if the factor is relatively mobile. Why then would low-skill 
workers in developing countries ever demand increased social spending in response to trade openness? Even those 
workers that stand to gain from trade in the long-run face short-term adjustment costs (Leamer 1997; Rodrik 1997). 
The higher these adjustment costs the more social spending workers will demand. 
20 Both constitutive terms are also included in the model as suggested by Brambor, Clark, and Golder (2006).   22
Models 3 and 4 which estimate simple OLS models. In these models, the interaction term is the 
product of the lagged level of imports and the lagged level of wage variance. Model 3 includes a 
lagged dependent variable while Model 4 does not. Model 4 is estimated using the Prais-Winsten 
estimation technique. Across all four model specifications, the key interaction term is statistically 
significant at the 1% level in two-tailed tests and has a positive coefficient, as expected. 
Increased exposure to foreign imports increases social spending when workers face high 
adjustment costs. Workers facing high adjustment costs respond to increased market volatility 
and trade exposure by demanding greater social insurance spending.  
When wage variance in equal to zero (i.e. labor is perfectly mobile between industries), 
increased imports have a short-term negative effect on social spending, as demonstrated by the 
coefficients on ∆Imports in Models 1 and 2.
21 This result is fully consistent with the theory 
advanced in this paper. When labor is able to costlessly adjust to market volatility (in labor 
abundant economies), workers gain from increased exposure to international trade. As a result, 
increased exposure to trade does not generate demands for increased social spending amongst 
workers. Instead, it appears that ‘efficiency concerns’ win out. That is, when workers are able to 
adjust costlessly to increased market volatility, social spending provides few benefits but 
continues to entail costs. These costs (i.e. taxes, hiring costs) make domestic products less 
competitive internationally. Perfectly mobile workers may therefore support reductions in social 
spending in response to increased openness.
22 But what happens when labor is less than perfectly 
mobile? To demonstrate the effect of imports on social spending across various levels of labor 
                                                 
21 This result is consistent with previous studies that find a negative relationship between trade openness and social 
spending among developing countries, when labor mobility is not considered (Kaufman & Segura-Ubiergo 2001; 
Rudra 2003). 
22 Although this result is consistent with the expectations derived from theory advanced here, it is perhaps less 
informative that one might think given that we never observe real world situations in which wage variance is 
actually equal to zero.   23
mobility, I estimate the elasticity of social insurance spending with respect to imports using the 
following equation: 
 
∂∆Welfare/∂∆Imports = β∆Imports + β ∆Imports*L.Wage variance Wage variance 
 
Substituting, the coefficients from Model 1 of Table 1, I get the following equation: 
 
∂∆Welfare/∂∆Imports = -0.216 + 0.0048*Wage variance 
 
which I calculate for various values of Wage variance. These results are displayed graphically by 
Figure 2.
23 The solid line in Figure 2 indicates how the marginal effect of imports changes with 
the level of labor mobility. The broken lines represent the 90% confidence intervals (for two-
tailed tests), which allow us to determine the conditions under which imports have a statistically 
significant effect on social spending. Whenever the upper and lower bounds of the confidence 
interval are both above (or below) the zero line, the relationship between imports and social 
spending is statistically significant (Brambor, Clark, and Golder 2006, 76). When workers face 
prohibitively high adjustment costs (i.e. inter-industry wage variance is high), increased exposure 
to foreign imports results in increased social spending, holding all else constant. However, 
imports have a strong reductive effect on social spending when labor faces low adjustment costs. 
This reductive effect declines as workers face higher and higher adjustment costs.  
Figure 2 provides strong evidence that the effect of trade openness on social spending is 
conditional on workers’ ability to adjust to market and price volatility. The effect of trade 
                                                 
23 This figure was produced with the help of computer code discussed in detail in Brambor, Clark, and Golder 
(2006).   24
openness on social insurances depends critically on the level of labor mobility in a given country. 
Increased trade openness has a positive effect on social insurance spending only when labor is 
relatively immobile. When it is costly for workers to adjust to market volatility, workers demand 
greater social insurance spending. However, when workers are able to adjust easily to market 
volatility, imports have a strong reductive effect on social spending. These results call into 
question studies that exclude the costs of adjusting to market volatility in their investigations of 
the effect of market volatility on social insurance spending.  
The results reported in Table 1 were obtained using a sample of 31 developing countries 
that are at least weakly democratic. The countries (or country-years to be more precise) included 
in this sample all scored above a zero on the Polity scale.
24 Although this sample includes 
countries with varying degrees of democracy, it excludes hard authoritarian regimes and 
autocracies. The relationship between workers’ demands and observed policy outcomes is likely 
differ between democracies and autocracies. Although the effects of different regimes types is 
not the central focus of this paper, I test to see if a similar pattern is found is a mixed-regime 
sample by re-estimating each of the four models reported in Table 1 using a sample of 46 
developing countries that have various regimes types. The results are reported in Table 2. Models 
1, 2, 3, and 4 are identical to those from Table 1. Models 1.1, 2.1, 3.1, and 4.1 are estimated 
using the mixed-regime sample of 46 developing countries. This sample includes the 31 
democracies from Table 1 and an additional 15 developing countries that have non-democratic 
regimes including Egypt, Kenya, and Tunisia. Amongst the mixed-regime sample, import 
exposure does not have a significant effect on social spending when wage variance is equal to 
zero. Furthermore, the effect of imports on social spending does not vary across levels of labor 
mobility in the mixed-regime sample. In fact, in three out of the four models estimated using the 
                                                 
24 Marshall and Jaggers 2002.   25
mixed-regime sample, the interaction term is statistically insignificant. Only in Model 3.1 does 
the interaction term reach conventional levels of statistical significance (10% level in a two-
tailed test). Here, it is positive and significant as expected. However, the marginal effect of 
imports on social spending is substantively smaller among the mixed-regime sample across all 
values of labor mobility. These results suggest that social spending levels are relatively less 
responsive to workers’ demands in non-democratic regimes.
25 This finding is consistent with 
previous empirical studies that demonstrat that increased trade exposure has a larger effect on the 
size of government in democratic countries (Adsera and Boix 2002). It also confirms many of the 
comparative statics derived from formal models of redistribution, most notably those of Boix 
(2002).
26   
As discussed previously, imports are more likely to exhibit the predicted effects on social 
spending than total trade. To test this possibility, I re-estimate the four models reported in Table 
1 replacing Imports with the conventional measure of trade openness, namely the sum of imports 
and exports as a percentage of GDP. These results are reported in Table 3. Models 1, 2, 3 and 4 
are identical to those reported in Table 1 where openness is measured using imports as a 
percentage of GDP. In Models 1.1, 2.1, 3.1 and 4.1, openness is measured using the sum of 
imports and exports as a percentage of GDP. The results reported in Table 3 suggest that imports 
have a larger substantive effect on social spending than imports and exports together. Among the 
OLS models, the interaction term is positive and significant in each of the four models. The 
marginal effect of imports on social spending is substantively larger than the marginal effect of 
                                                 
25 This is obviously a very crude test of the effect of political institutions. More nuanced arguments could certainly 
be made regarding electoral rules within high functioning democracies, as demonstrated by Iversen and Cusack 
(2001). These arguments are likely less applicable to the sample of developing countries examined here where few 
of these countries can be considered high-functioning democracies.  
26 This evidence does not, however, strongly support the Wintrobe (1998) hypothesis that authoritarian regimes may 
be responsive to the interests of labor.    26
imports plus exports, across all levels of labor mobility. In the error correction models, the 
interaction term is only significant when openness is measured using imports. When openness is 
measured using imports and exports, the interaction term remains positive but it is no longer 
statistically significant at conventional levels. Interestingly, both measures of openness have 
negative, significant effects on social spending in the short-term when labor is perfectly mobile 
between manufacturing industries (i.e. wage variance is equal to zero). When labor is perfectly 
mobile, a one percent increase in imports reduces social spending by 0.2% while a one percent 
increase in trade reduces social spending by only 0.08%. These results call into question studies 
that use the sum of imports and exports to test the compensation hypothesis.  
The relationship that emerges between imports, labor mobility and social spending 
among developing countries may not exist among developed countries. Recall that the inter-
industry wage differentials are calculated amongst low-skill industries.
27 The median voter in 
developing countries is more likely to be a low-skilled worker (or a worker employed in a low-
skill industry). As a result, the measure of labor mobility is more likely to capture the adjustment 
costs facing the median voter in developed countries. Furthermore, low skill workers in 
developed countries lose from trade regardless of their level of mobility. In developed countries, 
low skill workers are relatively scarce and as a result they stand to loose from increased foreign 
trade, as demonstrated by the Stolper-Samuelson theory. This suggests that the effect of free 
trade may only be conditional on the level of mobility amongst low-skill workers in developing 
countries. To test for this possibility, I re-estimate the four models reported in Table 1 using a 
                                                 
27 Some readers may object that low skill labor in developing countries stands to gain from international trade. In 
developing countries, low-skill labor is often the more abundant factor. As demonstrated by the Stolper-Samuelson 
theorem, abundant factors gain from increased trade, if the factor is relatively mobile. Why then would low-skill 
workers in developing countries ever demand increased social spending in response to trade openness? Even those 
workers that stand to gain from trade in the long-run face short-term adjustment costs (Leamer 1997; Rodrik 1997). 
The higher these adjustment costs the more social spending workers will demand.   27
sample of 24 developed countries including the United States, the United Kingdom and France. 
These results are reported in Table 4. Models 1, 2, 3, and 4 are identical to those reported in 
Table 1 and are reported here to allow for comparison between developing and developed 
countries. Models 1.1, 2.1, 3.1, and 4.1 are estimated using a sample of 24 developed countries. 
The interaction term is positive and significant for all of the error correction models. However, 
the interaction term is significant only for the developing-country samples in the OLS models. 
This may be because there is less intertemporal variance in both trade exposure and labor 
mobility among developed countries, as compared to developing countries.
28 Regardless, the 
OLS models suggest that imports have a long-term negative effect on social spending in 
developed economies, regardless of workers ability (or inability) to adjust to market volatility. 
The error correction model tells a slightly more complex story. In developed countries, imports 
have a significant, negative effects on social spending in both the short and long run when labor 
is perfectly mobile between manufacturing industries (i.e. wage variance equal zero). However, 
the short term effect of imports on social spending is mediated by the level of labor mobility in a 
given economy. This is virtually the same story as in developing countries except that imports do 
not appear to have a long-term negative effect on social spending in developing countries.   
Further work is needed to tease out the effects of economic development and labor mobility on 
social spending. However, these preliminary results suggest that labor mobility is perhaps a 




                                                 
28 By definition, the variance in the dependent variables in the two separate samples is reduced by separating the 
samples (Lewis-Beck and Skalaban 1990).   28
Conclusions and implications 
The compensation hypothesis rests on the assumption that workers respond to the 
increased market volatility brought about by globalization with demands for higher levels of 
social spending. To date, little research has examined the empirical validity of this assumption. 
In this research, I develop a theoretical model to identify those workers that are most likely to 
respond to increased market volatility with demands for greater social insurance. In sum, 
workers facing relatively high adjustment costs like, for example, those workers with specific 
skill sets are more likely to demand increases in social spending levels following trade 
liberalization. I empirically test the macro-level implications of this argument and find that the 
effect of increased trade exposure on social spending levels is, in fact, conditional on the average 
level of labor mobility in any given country. Imports have a strong reductive effect on social 
spending when labor faces low adjustment costs. This reductive effect declines as adjustment 
costs increase. When workers face very high adjustment costs, increased trade exposure results 
in increased social spending, holding all else constant. This pattern emerges most clearly 
amongst developing countries with democratic institutions.  
The findings reported here suggest a relatively simple solution to the persisting division 
in the scholarly literature between the efficiency and compensation hypotheses. Both arguments 
can be justified under different conditions. The efficiency hypothesis appears to hold when labor 
is relatively mobile between uses in a country’s economy. When workers can adjust to the price 
changes brought about by increased trade exposure with relative ease and few costs, they have 
little incentive to demand increased social spending. Instead, it appears that they support cuts in 
spending levels in order to increase the international competitiveness of their products. The 
compensation hypothesis finds the strongest empirical support when workers face high   29
adjustment costs. Workers for whom market volatility and unemployment risk are relatively 
more costly will demand increased social spending to offset some of the costs of risk. As such, 
the compensation hypothesis is most likely to find empirical support when workers face high 
adjustment costs.  
Globalization is likely only one piece of the welfare spending story. As such, there are 
reasons to be cautious about the findings reported here and what we can make of them. Equally 
important for explaining inter-temporal variance in social spending are other sources of market 
volatility and unemployment risk, such as deindustrialization (Iversen and Cusack 2001). 
Although I focus here solely on the effects of trade openness on social spending, I do so not 
because I believe that deindustrialization is unimportant for explaining temporal variance in 
social spending levels but rather because Iversen and Cusack (2001) have previously examined 
the effects of deindustrialization on welfare spending. It is reassuring to note that they find 
strikinly similar results. Labor mobility mediates the effect of deindustrialization on social 
spending in the same way that it has been shown here to mediate the effect of trade openness. 
Taken together, these studies suggest that labor mobility mediates the effect of any economic 
shock that increases labor market volatility on social spending,  
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Table 1: Estimated effect of increased imports on social spending conditional on labor mobility  
 1  2  3  4 
  ECM  ECM AR(1)  PA OLS  OLS AR(1) 
∆Imports*L.Wage variance  0.0048  0.005     
 (0.0016)*** (0.002)***     
L.Imports*L.Wage variance      0.0007  0.0009 
     (0.0002)***  (0.0002)*** 
L.Wage variance  0.012  0.01  -0.017  -0.003 
 (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.009)*  (0.007) 
∆Wage variance  0.026  0.028     
 (0.007)***  (0.009)***     
L.Imports   -0.004  0.007  -0.014  -0.035 
 (0.012)  (0.011)  (0.013)  (0.019)* 
∆Imports -0.216  -0.227     
 (0.057)***  (0.064)***     
L.Social spending  -0.216    0.776   
 (0.061)***    (0.063)***   
L.GDP per capita (nl)  0.162  -0.112  0.169  0.798 
 (0.331)  (0.292)  (0.323)  (0.646) 
∆GDP per capita (nl)  -1.439  -0.349     
 (2.353)  (2.105)     
L.Pop over 65  1.055  0.673  2.102  5.487 
 (0.338)***  (0.371)*  (0.838)**  (2.156)** 
∆Pop over 65  0.074  -0.067     
 (1.653)  (1.62)     
L.Growth -0.033  -0.069  -0.018  -0.011 
 (0.042)  (0.038)*  (0.024)  (0.028) 
∆Growth 0.031  -0.07     
 (0.038)  (0.038)*     
Observations 312  312  313  325 
Number of countries  31  31  31  31 
Notes: All models estimated using a sample of 31 developing, non-autocratic countries (ARG, 
BOL, BRA, BWA, CHL, COL, CRI, CYP, DOM, ECU, FJI, GHA, GTM, IND, LKA, MEX, 
MLT, MUS, MYS, PAK, PAN, PHL, POL, SLV, THA, TTO, TUR, URY, VEN, ZAF, ZWE) 
Data covers the period from 1976 to 1997. See Appendix B for the years during which each 
country enters the sample. Panel-corrected standard errors are reported in parentheses. * 
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. In models 3 and 4, the level 
measure of aged people (L.Pop over 65) is calculated as the cumulative country average 
beginning in 1970, following Huber and Stephens (2001). 31
Table 2: Estimated effect of imports in democracies versus all countries regardless of regime type 
 1  1.1  2  2.1  3  3.1  4  4.1 
 ECM  ECM  ECM AR(1)  ECM AR(1)  PA OLS  PA OLS  OLS AR(1) OLS AR(1)
∆Imports*L.Wage variance  0.0048  0.002  0.005  0.002         
 (0.0016)*** (0.002)  (0.002)***  (0.002)         
L.Imports*L.Wage variance          0.0007  0.0004  0.0009  0.0003 
         (0.0002)***  (0.0002)*  (0.0002)*** (0.0002) 
L.Wage variance  0.012  -0.004  0.01  -0.001  -0.017  -0.016  -0.003  -0.014 
 (0.012)  (0.008)  (0.012)  (0.009)  (0.009)*  (0.006)**  (0.007)  (0.006) 
∆Wage variance  0.026  0.015  0.028  0.019         
 (0.007)***  (0.006)***  (0.009)***  (0.0007)***         
L.Imports   -0.004  0.009  0.007  0.017  -0.014  -0.002  -0.035  -0.019 
 (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.013)  (0.012)  (0.019)*  (0.019) 
∆Imports -0.216  -0.091  -0.227  -0.095         
 (0.057)***  (0.066)  (0.064)***  (0.069)         
L.Social spending  -0.216  -0.225      0.776  0.760     
 (0.061)***  (0.047)***      (0.063)***  (0.047)***     
L.GDP per capita (nl)  0.162  0.01  -0.112  -0.072  0.169  0.227  0.798  0.806 
 (0.331)  (0.249)  (0.292)  (0.23)  (0.323)  (0.189)  (0.646)  (0.399)** 
∆GDP per capita (nl)  -1.439  -0.599  -0.349  0.151         
 (2.353)  (1.888)  (2.105)  (1.823)         
L.Pop over 65  1.055  0.996  0.673  0.361  2.102  2.19  5.487  6.409 
 (0.338)***  (0.282)***  (0.371)*  (0.3)  (0.838)**  (0.526)***  (2.156)**  (1.222)*** 
∆Pop over 65  0.074  -0.273  -0.067  -0.686         
 (1.653)  (1.428)  (1.62)  (1.325)         
L.Growth -0.033  -0.026  -0.069  -0.043  -0.018  0.013  -0.011  0.002 
 (0.042)  (0.033)  (0.038)*  (0.032)  (0.024)  (0.023)  (0.028)  (0.020) 
∆Growth 0.031  -0.053  -0.07  -0.076         
 (0.038)  (0.027)*  (0.038)*  (0.028)***         
Observations 312  610  312  610  313  611  325  635 
Number of countries  31  46  31  46  31  46  31  46 
Notes: Panel-corrected standard errors are reported in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. In 
models 3 and 4, the level measure of aged people is calculated as the cumulative country average beginning in 1970, following Huber 
and Stephens (2001).  32
Table 3: Estimated effect of imports versus total trade 
 1  1.1  2  2.1  3  3.1  4  4.1 
 ECM  ECM  ECM AR(1)  ECM AR(1)  PA OLS  PA OLS  OLS AR(1) OLS AR(1)
∆Open*L.Wage variance  0.0048  0.0017  0.005  0.002         
 (0.0016)*** (0.0013)  (0.002)***  (0.001)         
L.Open*L.Wage variance          0.0007  0.0004  0.0009  0.0005 
         (0.0002)***  (0.0001)*** (0.0002)*** (0.0001)***
L.Wage variance  0.012  0.009  0.01  0.008  -0.017  -0.018  -0.003  -0.005 
 (0.012)  (0.009)  (0.012)  (0.013)  (0.009)*  (0.009)**  (0.007)  (0.007) 
∆Wage variance  0.026  0.027  0.028  0.03         
 (0.007)***  (0.007)***  (0.009)***  (0.009)***         
L.Open   -0.004  -0.007  0.007  0.004  -0.014  -0.015  -0.035  -0.028 
 (0.012)  (0.008)  (0.011)  (0.007)  (0.013)  (0.008)*  (0.019)*  (0.013)** 
∆Open -0.216  -0.088  -0.227  -0.084         
 (0.057)***  (0.049)**  (0.064)***  (0.044)*         
L.Social spending  -0.216  -0.219      0.776  0.774     
 (0.061)***  (0.062)***      (0.063)***  (0.062)***     
L.GDP per capita (nl)  0.162  0.204  -0.112  -0.166  0.169  0.282  0.798  0.935 
 (0.331)  (0.374)  (0.292)  (0.327)  (0.323)  (0.353)  (0.646)  (0.696) 
∆GDP per capita (nl)  -1.439  -1.227  -0.349  -0.105         
 (2.353)  (2.392)  (2.105)  (2.119)         
L.Pop over 65  1.055  1.091  0.673  0.713  2.102  2.06  5.487  5.405 
 (0.338)***  (0.356)***  (0.371)*  (0.384)*  (0.838)**  (0.849)***  (2.156)**  (2.211)** 
∆Pop over 65  0.074  0.511  -0.067  0.303         
 (1.653)  (1.653)  (1.62)  (1.651)         
L.Growth -0.033  -0.040  -0.069  -0.082  -0.018  -0.012  -0.011  -0.009 
 (0.042)  (0.042)  (0.038)*  (0.038)**  (0.024)  (0.025)  (0.028)  (0.028) 
∆Growth 0.031  -0.038  -0.07  -0.08         
 (0.038)  (0.038)  (0.038)*  (0.038)**         
Observations 312  312  312  312  313  313  325  325 
Number of countries  31  31  31  31  31  31  31  31 
Notes: Panel-corrected standard errors are reported in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. In 
models 3 and 4, the level measure of aged people is calculated as the cumulative country average beginning in 1970, following Huber 
and Stephens (2001).  33
Table 4: Estimated effect of imports in developing versus developed countries 
 1  1.1  2  2.1  3  3.1  4  4.1 
 ECM  ECM  ECM AR(1)  ECM AR(1)  PA OLS  PA OLS  OLS AR(1) OLS AR(1)
∆Imports*L.Wage variance  0.0048  0.003  0.005  0.003         
 (0.0016)*** (0.001)**  (0.002)***  (0.001)***         
L.Imports*L.Wage variance          0.0007  -0.0001  0.0009  -0.0001 
         (0.0002)***  (0.0001)  (0.0002)*** (0.0002) 
L.Wage variance  0.012  0.006  0.01  0.005  -0.017  0.0088  -0.003  0.008 
 (0.012)  (0.005)  (0.012)  (0.006)  (0.009)*  (0.0054)  (0.007)  (0.006) 
∆Wage variance  0.026  -0.003  0.028  -0.002         
 (0.007)***  (0.006)  (0.009)***  (0.007)         
L.Imports   -0.004  -0.099  0.007  -0.059  -0.014  -0.086  -0.035  -0.141 
 (0.012)  (0.025)***  (0.011)  (0.025)**  (0.013)  (0.026)***  (0.019)*  (0.045)*** 
∆Imports -0.216  -0.129  -0.227  -0.144         
 (0.057)***  (0.052)**  (0.064)***  (0.054)***         
L.Social spending  -0.216  -0.160      0.776  0.847     
 (0.061)***  (0.048)***      (0.063)***  (0.053)***     
L.GDP per capita (nl)  0.162  0.911  -0.112  0.411  0.169  0.746  0.798  1.682 
 (0.331)  (0.438)**  (0.292)  (0.49)  (0.323)  (0.471)  (0.646)  (0.966)* 
∆GDP per capita (nl)  -1.439  -0.504  -0.349  0.46         
 (2.353)  (3.32)  (2.105)  (3.53)         
L.Pop over 65  1.055  -0.352  0.673  -0.142  2.102  -0.364  5.487  0.154 
 (0.338)***  (0.266)  (0.371)*  (0.319)  (0.838)**  (0.540)  (2.156)**  (1.111) 
∆Pop over 65  0.074  -0.492  -0.067  0.256         
 (1.653)  (0.898)  (1.62)  (1.05)         
L.Growth -0.033  -0.099  -0.069  -0.082  -0.018  -0.057  -0.011  -0.061 
 (0.042)  (0.065)  (0.038)*  (0.068)  (0.024)  (0.038)  (0.028)  (0.043) 
∆Growth 0.031  -0.056  -0.07  -0.059         
 (0.038)  (0.050)  (0.038)*  (0.053)         
Observations 312  383  312  383  313  383  325  391 
Number of countries  31  24  31  24  31  24  31  24 
Notes: Panel-corrected standard errors are reported in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. In 
models 3 and 4, the level measure of aged people is calculated as the cumulative country average beginning in 1970, following Huber 
and Stephens (2001). 34
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Figure 2: Year to year differences in spending on social security and welfare (as a percentage of 
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Notes: Spending data come from the IMF Government Finance Statistics (2001). Liberalization 
dates are from Wacziarg and Wallack (2004). Labor mobility is measured using UNIDO 
employment data (2005). Countries whose average rate of change in the employment distribution 
is above the sample median are coded as specific labor countries. Data for these countries are 
contained in the right box.  36
 































Notes: Inter-industry wage differentials are estimated using the coefficient of variance for 
average wages among 15 low-skill manufacturing industries. Data are from the UNIDO 
Industrial Statistics Database (2005).   37
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Notes: Values estimated using coefficients from Model 1 Table 1.   38
 
Appendix A: Low skill industries 
 
Low-skill manufacturing industries  ISIC categories 
Leather and rubber products  323, 355 
Wood products, except furniture; paper and paper products   331, 341 
Textiles; leather products; wearing apparel, except footwear; 
footwear, except rubber or plastic 
312, 323, 322, 324 
Other nonmetallic mineral products; glass and products; 
pottery, china, and earthenware 
369, 362, 361 
Iron and steel; fabricated metal products  371, 381 
Furniture, except metal  332 
Plastic products; other manufactured products  356, 390 
 
Note: This classification of industries by average skill-level was originally developed by Wood 
and Mayer (1998).   39
Appendix B: Sample of 31 developing, non-autocratic countries  
 
Country  Years in sample 
Argentina 1985-90,  1994-97 
Bolivia 1989-97 
Botswana 1982-88,  1993-96 
Brazil 1993-94 
Chile 1989-97 
Colombia 1983-86,  1991-97 
Costa Rica  1985-97 
Cyprus 1977-96 
Dominican Republic  1978-85 
Ecuador 1979-90 
El Salvador  1982-85, 1994-97 




Malaysia 1976-81,  1986-97 




Panama 1989-94,  1997 
Philippines 1986-97 
Poland 1995-96 
South Africa  1985 
Sri Lanka  1981-97 
Thailand 1989-90,  1994 
Trinidad and Tobago  1977-78, 1994-95 
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